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Abstract
Coordinated management among many private forest land owners will often be required to achieve ecosystem
management at the landscape scale. A case study of landowners in southern New England shows that although most
hold favorable attitudes towards coordinated management, economic incentives may be needed to actually imple-
ment coordinated management programs. Yet the conjoint analyses used in this study suggests that economic
incentives, such as property tax reductions, are not likely to substantially increase the probability that coordinated
management programs will actually be undertaken. For example, an increase in property tax savings from $706 per
year to $2000 per year only increased the probability of program adoption from 1.4 to 5.6%. Alternative ways in
which coordinated management programs might be marketed are discussed.  2001 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights
reserved.
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1. Introduction
Landscapes large enough for effective ecosys-
Ž .tem management EM often have many owners
Ž .Brunson et al., 1996 . Although forest land frag-
Corresponding author. Tel.: 1-413-545-5714; fax: 1-
413-545-5853.
Ž .E-mail address: tstevens@resecon.umass.edu T. Stevens .
mentation continues to increase worldwide, this
problem is particularly apparent in much of the
eastern United States, western Europe and the
formerly communist countries of central and east-
ern Europe. In southern New England, for exam-
ple, more than 75% of forest land is classified as
non-industrial private forest, NIPF, and over 55%
of this land is in parcels that are less than 100
Ž .acres Birch, 1996 . Some degree of coordinated
management among many private owners will,
therefore, be required to achieve EM at the land-
scape scale.
Previous research suggests that although most
landowners in southern New England hold favor-
able attitudes toward the concept of coordinated
Žmanagement to achieve EM objectives Ricken-
.bach et al., 1998 , the majority would probably
not actually undertake coordinated management
programs that involve either explicit or implicit
Ž .cost to themselves Stevens et al., 1999 . Economic
incentives may therefore be needed to accomplish
the degree of coordination required for successful
EM, but little is known about the relationship
between incentives and the likelihood of coordi-
nated management program participation.
This paper focuses on a case study of the effect
of economic incentives on the probability of NIPF
landowner participation in coordinated manage-
ment programs. The impacts of several other fac-
tors on program participation, like harvest restric-
tions, and landowner characteristics, are also in-
vestigated.
2. Background
Surveys of NIPF landowners conducted by
Ž .Brunson et al. 1996 and by Rickenbach et al.
Ž .1998 indicate that most landowners in southern
New England are favorably disposed to the idea
of coordinated management to achieve effective
Ž .EM. However, Brunson et al. 1996 also found
that few respondents would definitely be willing
to undertake management activities jointly with-
out first seeing examples of how this would work.
Ž .More recently, Stevens et al. 1999 surveyed
1250 southern New England residents owning 10
acres or more of forest land. A conjoint analysis
was used in which each owner was asked to rate
four different hypothetical management scenarios
that are examples of ones that might be applied
in an EM plan, on a scale of 110 with 10
indicating scenarios, if any, the individual would
definitely undertake. Management activities in
each scenario included maintenance of apple trees
for wildlife habitat, protection of rare ferns, im-
provement of a recreational trail, and harvest of a
specified percentage of timber land. A split sam-
ple survey approach was employed wherein
landowners were partitioned into two groups.
Each received an identical survey except that in
one group all management activities would be
coordinated with two neighbors while the other
group was asked about the same management
activities for a single equivalent parcel owned by
the individual.
The results indicated that these landowners
would be as likely to undertake coordinated man-
agement programs as they would be to undertake
the same programs independently. However, the
probability of undertaking any of the manage-
ment scenarios examined in this study was quite
low; the probability of program adoption ranged
from 0.02 to 0.18, suggesting that economic incen-
tives may be needed to inspire landowners to
participate in coordinated management among
properties.
Ž .A second conjoint study by Stevens et al. 2000
presented 1116 southern New England landown-
ers with four management scenarios; mainte-
Ž .nance of the status quo do nothing and three
alternatives involving coordinated management to
be achieved by setting aside a portion of a hypo-
thetical tract of land to create a buffer zone to
provide a wildlife corridor connecting two larger
off-property wildlife habitats. The alternative sce-
Ž .narios involved: 1 various levels of acreage set
Ž .aside for the buffer zone; 2 a range of annual
costs of buffer zone maintenance through plant-
Ž .ing and soil stabilization; and 3 three levels of
increase in the population of a rare species of
Ž .wood turtle downstream of, and off the
landowner’s hypothetical property. The probabil-
ity of coordinated program adoption ranged
between 0.13 and 0.52, depending on the conjoint
Ž .model specification, for a program that: 1 sets
Ž .aside a 12-acre buffer zone; 2 costs each
Ž .landowner $200 per year; and 3 results in a 12%
increase in the turtle population. However, since
all survey respondents were already enrolled in a
forest stewardship management program, the es-
timated probability of coordinated program adop-
tion is undoubtedly higher for this group than for
the forest landowner population in general. In
other words, this study also tends to suggest that
incentives will probably be needed to implement
coordinated management programs that require
participation by a majority of owners.
3. Methods
In order to investigate the effect of economic
incentives on the likelihood of coordinated pro-
gram adoption among southern New England
landowners, a survey was administered to five
landowner focus groups in the spring, 1999. Focus
group participants were solicited by phone from a
list of several hundred Massachusetts landowners
who were identified through town property own-
ership records. Everyone contacted by phone was
offered $50 to participate in one of the focus
groups. A total of 57 landowners participated in
this study.
The survey administered to these focus groups
Ž .consisted of three parts: 1 a preliminary set of
Ž .questions; 2 conjoint questions consisting of a
series of alternative coordinated management
programs that each participant was asked to rate;
Ž . 1and 3 follow-up questions . The preliminary
questions, which dealt mainly with landowner
traits and attitudes, included questions on the
amount of land owned, reasons for ownership,
gender, age, income from the land and other
sources, membership in organizations and enroll-
ment in existing forest management programs.
The conjoint section of the survey presented a
scenario asking each respondent to assume that
they owned a hypothetical 100-acre parcel of land.
The market value of this land was specified, and
the portion that could be developed for residen-
tial use was defined. Annual land taxes and an-
nual income available from timber harvest were
also specified. Graphics were used to show the
layout of this land. This helped to ensure that
participants were all considering the same sce-
nario.
The participants were then told to imagine that
the Massachusetts Department of Environmental
Management, working with local landowners and
1 The survey instrument was pre-tested with a group of 10
landowners.
interest groups, had developed an EM plan for a
large area under multiple ownerships that in-
cluded this parcel. Participation would be volun-
tary, but economic incentives would be provided
to encourage landowners to submit to certain
restrictions and requirements related to the man-
agement of the land.
Each participant was then presented with the
Ž .status quo do nothing and 16 alternative ver-
sions of the plan which they were asked to rate on
a scale of 19 in terms of the likelihood that they
Žwould participate 1definitely would not; 9
.definitely would . Each version of the plan con-
sisted of different combinations of levels of five
attributes:
 Timber harvestprotected areas. Harvest
would be allowed on some portion of the land
Ž .currently available 13, 23, or all , while the
Žremaining portion would be protected 23,
.13, or none, respectively from harvest.
 Recreation. The landowner either would be
required to allow limited public access to a
trail corridor on their land or they would not
be required to do so.
 Magnitude of incentive. The land would be
assessed for tax purposes at some portion of
Ž .its market value 13, 23, or full value .
 Duration of commitment. The landowner
would have to make a commitment of either
10 years or 20 years.
 Penalty. If the landowner withdrew from the
plan prior to the fulfillment of their commit-
ment, they would be required to pay back
taxes on the difference between market values
and assessed value on the removed land, plus
interest on that difference, for either the most
recent 3 years or the most recent 6 years of
the unfulfilled commitment.
The participants were provided with specific
financial implications of each alternative based on
annual reduction in timber sale revenues associ-
ated with the ‘timber harvestprotected areas’
attribute, and the annual reduction in taxes asso-
ciated with the ‘magnitude of incentive’ attribute.
The combinations of attribute levels used in
this study were chosen using the SPSS Conjoint
software package, which yields an orthogonal de-
sign that allows analysis over the entire range of
combinations with the smallest possible subset of
those combinations. The 16 management pro-
grams and the status quo situation considered in
this study are summarized in Table 1.
Conjoint analysis was used to estimate the ef-
fect of economic incentives on the likelihood that
Table 1
Summary of coordinated programs
Timber harvest Recreation Magnitude of Duration of Penalty
a bprotected areas public access incentive commitment
Alternative 0 All avail., none protect. None Assessed full NA NA
Ž .status quo $1200year revenues $3000year tax
$0year loss $0year gain
Alternative 1 13 avail., 23 protect. Limited Assessed 13 20 years Back taxes,
$400year revenues $1000year tax, interest
$800year loss $2000year gain 6-year max.
Alternative 2 23 avail., 13 protect. Limited Assessed 23 10 years Back taxes,
$800year revenues $2000year tax, interest
$400year loss $1000year gain 3-year max.
Alternative 3 13 avail., 23 protect. None Assessed full 10 years Back taxes,
$400year revenues $3000year tax interest
$800year loss $0year gain 3-year max.
Alternative 4 All avail., none protect. None Assessed 13 10 years Back taxes,
$1,200year revenues $1000year tax, interest
$0year loss $2000year gain 6-year max.
Alternative 5 23 avail., 13 protect. None Assessed full 20 years Back taxes,
$800year revenues $3000year tax interest
$400year loss $0year gain 6-year max.
Alternative 6 All avail., none protect. None Assessed full 10 years Back taxes,
$1,200year revenues $3000year tax interest
$0year loss $0year gain 3-year max.
Alternative 7 All avail., none protect. Limited Assessed full 10 years Back taxes,
$1,200year revenues $3000year tax interest
$0year loss $0year gain 6-year max.
Alternative 8 All avail., none protect. Limited Assessed 23 20 years Back taxes,
$1,200year revenues $2000year tax, interest
$0year loss $1000year gain 6-year max.
Alternative 9 All avail., none protect. Limited Assessed full 20 years Back taxes,
$1,200year revenues $3000year tax interest
$0year loss $0year gain 3-year max.
Alternative 10 13 avail., 23 protect. Limited Assessed full 20 years Back taxes,
$400year revenues $3000year tax interest
$800year loss $0year gain 3-year max.
Ž .Table 1 Continued
Timber harvest Recreation Magnitude of Duration of Penalty
a bprotected areas public access incentive commitment
Alternative 11 All avail., none protect. None Assessed full 20 years Back taxes,
$1,200year revenues $3000year tax interest
$0year loss $0year gain 6-year max.
Alternative 12 23 avail., 13 protect. Limited Assessed full 10 years Back taxes,
$800year revenues $3000year tax interest
$400year loss $0year gain 6-year max.
Alternative 13 All avail., none protect. None Assessed 23 20 years Back taxes,
$1,200year revenues $2000year tax, interest
$0year loss $1000year gain 3-year max.
Alternative 14 All avail., none protect. Limited Assessed 13 10 years Back taxes,
$1,200year revenues $1000year tax, interest
$0year loss $2000year gain 3-year max.
Alternative 15 13 avail., 23 protect. None Assessed 23 10 years Back taxes,
$400year revenues $2000year tax, interest
$800year loss $1000year gain 6-year max.
Alternative 16 23 avail., 13 protect. None Assessed 13 20 years Back taxes,
$800year revenues $1000year tax, interest
$400year loss $2000year gain 3-year max.
a Loss refers to potential timber reserve foregone as compared with the status-quo.
bGain refers to tax savings as compared with the status-quo.
landowners would participate in the plans pre-
sented. Three conjoint models were employed. In
all cases, individuals are assumed to make choices
that increase their utility or satisfaction. The util-
ity that the ith individual derives from the jth
Ž .management program U can be represented as:ij
 Ž .U Z B C B e 1i j j i j i i i j
Žwhere Z is a vector of attributes timber harvest,j
.tax incentive, public access, etc. of the jth man-
agement program, B is a vector of unknowni j
Ž .parameters or weights associated with these at-
tributes, C is a vector of other factors, includingi
individual characteristics influencing utility, B isi
a vector of unknown parameters and e is ai
random variable.
In conjoint analysis, a respondent’s utility level
Ž .U for each of the j programs is not known.i j
Rather, a program rating r is observed. Wei j
assume that:
Ž . Ž .r h U 2i j i j
where h is a transformation function. Each indi-
vidual’s rating of alternative management pro-
grams therefore depends on the program at-
tributes discussed above and characteristics of the
individual like age and income.
The first conjoint model employed in this study
examines the empirical relationship between EM
program attributes, other characteristics and re-
spondent’s ratings. The model that was estimated
is:
RateB B HARVLOSSB RECACC0 1 2
B TAXGAINB3 4
COMMITB PENALTYB5 6
ACRETOTB GENDERB7 8
AGEB INCTOTEB9 10
INCTOTDB11
INCTOTCB12
INCTOTBB13
FORASSOCB CHAP61B14 15
Ž .SIPB FOREVERe 316
where Rate is the individual ratings of the 16
programs and the status-quo and all other vari-
ables are defined in Table 2. In this formulation
variables 616 are included to capture the effects
of tastes, preferences, and other circumstances
that vary among individuals.
As shown in Table 2, we hypothesize that pro-
Ž .gram ratings and utility decline with an increase
in harvest revenues foregone, length of program
commitment, and magnitude of penalty. However,
Ž .as the incentive TAXGAIN increases, we expect
an increase in program rating, all else held con-
stant.
The second model assumes that when enrolled
in one of the coordinated management programs
considered here, individual utility is represented
Ž .by Eq. 1 , and that individual utility derived from
forest land ownership in the status quo situation
may be expressed by:
 Ž .U Z B C B e 4i0 0 i0 i i i0
where Z represents the vector of forest land0
attributes associated with the status quo. The
individual is assumed to enroll in a management
program if, and only if:
Ž .U  U 5i j i0
Utility difference, dV, can then be expressed as:
Ž .dVU U 6i j i0
If utility is assumed to be linear, additive, and
separable with respect to all attributes, dV is
given by:
Ž .dVU U e e 7i j i0 i j i0
Table 2
Survey data summary
Coordinated management Units Minimum Mean Maximum Expected
value value value sign
Plan characteristics
HARVLOSS $year 0 282.353 800 
RECACC 1yes; 0no 0 0.471 1 
TAXGAIN $year 0 705.882 2000 
COMMIT Years 0 14.118 20 
PENALTY Years 0 4.235 6 
Landowner characteristics
ACRETOT Total acres 3 140.364 972
GENDER 1 if male 0 0.768 1
AGE Years 29 55.286 82
INCTOTE $100 000 0 0.091 1
INCTOTD $75 000 to $100 000 0 0.091 1
INCTOTC $50 000 to $75 000 0 0.291 1
INCTOTB $25 000 to $50 000 0 0.345 1
FORASSOC 1yes; 0no 0 0.429 1
CHAP61 1yes; 0no 0 0.839 1
SIP 1yes; 0no 0 0.375 1
FOREVER 1 if yes 0 0.679 1
The probability of program participation can then
be written as:
Ž . Ž .PrG dV 8
where G is the probability function for the ran-
Ž .dom component of utility e e . Assuming ai j i0
logit probability function for G, the probability of
program participation is:
1dVŽ . Ž .PrG 1e 9
Empirical estimates of the probability of pro-
gram participation therefore involve estimating
 Ž .dV see Eq. 7 . The following approximation of
utility difference was used:
Ž . Ž . Ž .dVB B Z B C e 100 1 2
where Z is the vector of the change in program
 Ž .attributes from the status quo see Eq. 7 , and
other variables are as defined above. From Eq.
Ž .9 , the model that is estimated is a binary logit
model:
1Ž . Ž .E Y  11Ž B B ŽZ .B ŽC .e.0 1 21e
where the dependent variable, Y, is a binary vari-
able such that Y1 for programs that were rated
above the status quo, and Y0 otherwise, while
Ž .B , B , and B are estimated coefficients. Eq. 110 1 2
can then be used to calculate the probability,
Ž .E Y1 , that a program with attributes Z is
preferred to the status quo.
The third model is the same as the second
except that the binary dependent variable, Y, is
set equal to one for programs that would de-
Ž .finitely be undertaken rating9 and Y0 oth-
Ž . Ž .erwise rating18 . Eq. 11 is then used to
calculate the probability that a specific program
would actually be adopted.
4. Results
The data derived from the surveys are pre-
sented in Table 2. As shown in Table 2, the
average value of harvests forgone associated with
the programs presented was approximately $282
Ž .per year while the average incentive TAXGAIN
was a tax reduction of approximately $706 per
year. The average management program involved
a 14 year commitment and the average penalty
Ž .for early withdrawal back taxes plus interest was
approximately 4 years.
In terms of landowner characteristics, the aver-
age participant owned 140 acres of forest land,
and was approximately 55 years old. Approxi-
mately 35% of the respondents had annual in-
comes in the $25 000 to $50 000 range, and ap-
proximately 43% belonged to a forestry associa-
tion. Approximately two-thirds of the study re-
spondents said they would consider a perpetual
Žcommitment to a coordinated program FORE-
.VER .
Of particular importance is that 84% were en-
rolled in Chapter 61, which provides reduced
property taxes in exchange for timber manage-
ment, and approximately 38% were enrolled in
the Stewardship Incentive Program, SIP. This
state program provides landowners with cost-shar-
ing for management practices such as habitat
improvement and recreationaesthetics enhance-
ments.
The Chapter 61 program, administered by the
Massachusetts Department of Environmental
Management, allows a substantial property tax
deferment for woodland owners who follow a
prescribed management plan. Only approximately
14% of all eligible landowners in the state are
enrolled. Therefore, the participants in this study
are clearly not representative of the population as
a whole. We suspect that Chapter 61 participants
are likely to be more knowledgeable about land
use issues and more likely to enroll in coordi-
nated management programs.
Results of estimating the three conjoint models
are presented in Table 3.2 Focusing first on the
Ž .ratings model model 1 , program ratings in-
creased, as expected, with the magnitude of the
2 Results from model 1 were derived from the OLS proce-
dure. Ordered logit results were virtually identical. Results
from models 2 and 3 were derived from the logit estimating
procedure. Sensitivity of the results to model specification and
estimating method can be obtained from the senior author.
Table 3
Parameter estimates and significance
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Estimate Estimate Estimate
2 2Ž  . Ž . Ž .Prob T Prob Prob
HARVLOSS 0.000159 0.000055 0.001010
Ž . Ž . Ž .0.5154 0.8272 0.0663
RECACC 0.030622 0.131400 0.199400
Ž . Ž . Ž .0.8499 0.4322 0.5194
  TAXGAIN 0.001445 0.000700 0.001120
Ž . Ž . Ž .0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
  COMMIT 0.039598 0.028800 0.062100
Ž . Ž . Ž .0.0060 0.0854 0.0285
PENALTY 0.122690 0.073900 0.101400
Ž . Ž . Ž .0.0106 0.1851 0.2637
 ACRETOT 0.001737 0.001120 0.001620
Ž . Ž . Ž .0.0005 0.0285 0.1908
GENDER 1.159723 0.280000 0.420000
Ž . Ž . Ž .0.0001 0.1851 0.3267
AGE 0.000982 0.004470 0.019900
Ž . Ž . Ž .0.8964 0.5658 0.1557
 INCTOTE 0.656681 0.857600 14.787100
Ž . Ž . Ž .0.0687 0.0181 0.9705
INCTOTD 0.665580 0.793100 0.805400
Ž . Ž . Ž .0.1008 0.0590 0.2208
 INCTOTC 0.555135 0.201700 1.701300
Ž . Ž . Ž .0.0450 0.4847 0.0002
INCTOTB 0.760633 0.447600 1.175300
Ž . Ž . Ž .0.0057 0.1140 0.0041
 FORASSOC 0.460554 0.582000 0.016700
Ž . Ž . Ž .0.0086 0.0017 0.9635
CHAP61 0.212037 0.201400 0.312200
Ž . Ž . Ž .0.3790 0.4157 0.4438
 SIP 0.497713 0.350500 0.345300
Ž . Ž . Ž .0.0047 0.0570 0.3603
FOREVER 0.354479 0.089900 0.396900
Ž . Ž . Ž .0.0621 0.6508 0.2976
Significant at 90%,  significant at 95%.
Ž .economic incentive offered TAXGAIN and rat-
ings decreased with length of commitment and
penalty. However, the value of timber harvests
Ž .forgone HARVLOSS and recreation access
Ž .RECACC were not statistically significant fac-
tors. This finding is consistent with several previ-
Ž .ous studies see Rickenbach et al., 1998 suggest-
ing that timber harvest is not a primary concern
of most NIPF landowners in southern New Eng-
land.
It is also important to note that program rat-
ings decreased with the total acreage held by the
landowner and increased for those who were en-
rolled in SIP or were members of a forestry
association. Enrollment in Chapter 61 was not
statistically significant, but this is likely due to the
lack of variability associated with this variable
Žalmost 84% of respondents were enrolled in
.Chapter 61 .
ŽResults from model 2 estimates of landowner
.interest differ in several respects. The primary
difference from the perspective of this study is
that program penalty was not a statistically sig-
nificant factor related to interest in program par-
Ž .ticipation i.e. ranking above the status quo . Also,
those who are enrolled in the SIP program are
less likely to be interested in coordinated man-
agement.
ŽResults derived from the third model probabil-
ity that a program would definitely be under-
.taken differ from the second in that the decrease
in the probability of program adoption with in-
creases in the value of timber harvests forgone is
statistically significant. Perhaps the loss of timber
revenue was more difficult to tolerate when the
landowner was asked to make a firm commitment
to a program. As expected, the likelihood of coor-
dinated program adoption increased with the in-
centive offered and decreased with the length of
commitment. However, penalty, total acres, and
membership in forestry associations, Chapter 61
or SIP were not statistically significant factors
influencing whether the coordinated program
Ž .would definitely be adopted rating9 .
Ž .The estimates derived from model 2 Table 3
Ž .were used as shown in Eq. 11 to estimate the
probability that landowners are interested in
Žcoordinated management programs i.e. rating
Table 4
aProbabilities of program interest and adoption
Range of Mean Interest model 2 Adoption model 3
values value Probability Probability Probability Probability
at min. at max. at min. at max.
HARVLOSS 0800 282.353 0.444 0.433 0.018 0.008
RECACC 01 0.471 0.425 0.457 0.015 0.012
TAXGAIN 02000 705.882 0.324 0.660 0.006 0.056
COMMIT 020 14.118 0.541 0.399 0.032 0.010
PENALTY 06 4.235 0.518 0.408 0.021 0.011
ACRETOT 3972 140.364 0.478 0.236 0.017 0.004
GENDER 01 0.768 0.494 0.424 0.010 0.015
AGE 2982 55.286 0.469 0.411 0.008 0.023
INCTOTE 01 0.091 0.421 0.632 0.051 0.000
INCTOTD 01 0.091 0.422 0.618 0.015 0.007
INCTOTC 01 0.291 0.426 0.476 0.022 0.004
INCTOTB 01 0.345 0.479 0.370 0.020 0.006
FORASSOC 01 0.429 0.380 0.523 0.014 0.014
CHAP61 01 0.839 0.399 0.448 0.018 0.013
SIP 01 0.375 0.473 0.387 0.016 0.011
FOREVER 01 0.679 0.455 0.433 0.010 0.016
a Probabilities represent the likelihood of adoption or interest with the variable in question at its minimum or maximum value
and all other variables at their mean values. The probability with all variables at their mean values is 0.014 for model 3, and 0.440
for model 2.
.greater than that given to the status quo . The
results of these calculations are summarized in
Table 4. As shown in Table 4, the probability that
landowners are interested in these programs is
quite high. With all model 2 variables at mean
values, the probability that a study participant
would be interested in the ‘average’ coordinated
Ž .program is 0.44 44% . Even with no financial
Ž .incentive TAXGAIN0 , 32% of owners would
be interested in coordination, and, the level of
interest increases dramatically as the incentive
increases.
However, as is also shown in Table 4, the
probability that landowners would actually adopt
programs of the type examined in this study is
very small, even when sizable incentives are of-
fered. With all model 3 variables at their mean
Ž .values see Table 4 , the probability that the
‘average’ EM program would be adopted by the
group of landowners participating in this study
Ž .was only 0.014 i.e. 1.4% . An increase in the
economic incentive from approximately $706 per
Ž . Žyear mean value to $2000 per year maximum
.value increased the probability of program adop-
tion from only 1.4 to 5.6%, all else held constant.
A decrease in the duration of program commit-
Ž .ment from 14 years mean value to 0 years
Ž .minimum value only increased the probability of
program adoption from 1.4 to 3.2%.
5. Summary
This analysis tends to confirm the findings of
several previous studies; landowners are quite
interested in coordinated management, but the
likelihood of NIPF owners actually enrolling in
such programs is quite small. The probability of
coordinated plan adoption remains very small
even when substantial incentives are offered. This
is consistent with the low rates of enrollment in
existing plans in southern New England and is
somewhat alarming with regard to the prospects
for success of ecosystem management of the type
examined here. However, this analysis does sug-
gest ways in which coordinated programs might
be marketed. For example, resource agencies
could target landowners already involved in
forestry-related organizations and programs. Not
only do these landowners appear from our analy-
sis to be more favorably inclined toward coordi-
nation, the organizations and programs them-
selves could be an efficient means for identifying
landowners and disseminating information.
Some of the broader implications of this re-
search from a management plan development
standpoint are that coordinated management
plans will have a higher likelihood of being
adopted if they offer large tax incentives and
short commitments. In terms of other plan char-
acteristics studied here, it is also useful to know
that NIPF landowners do not seem terribly
concerned with the loss of potential timber rev-
enue and they are fairly agreeable to reasonable
public recreational use of their land. The willing-
Žness of landowners to make sacrifices timber
.harvests, recreation access and their desire for
flexibility suggests that agencies seeking to de-
velop a viable plan might consider imposing fairly
stringent requirements, but also allowing
landowners to enroll on a trial basis. However, if
wide scale adoption of coordinated management
is to be achieved, something other than the type
of economic incentive examined here will probably
be needed. We suggest that future research should
focus specifically on the reasons why landowners
are uncertain about actually enrolling in coordi-
nated management programs.
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